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Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith:
The Erosion of Religious Liberty
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are cre-
ated equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness.
Declaration of Independence (1776)1
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction
and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to
exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an
unalienable right.
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance (1785)2
I. Introduction
Of paramount concern to the Founding Fathers in declaring
themselves free from persecution, was securing to each and
every "Man," unalienable fundamental rights.' Unfortunately,
one of those rights, the constitutional right of free exercise of
religion4 has been abridged by the Supreme Court in Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith
(Smith I). This Note examines the nature and extent of the
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
2. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
(1785), reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 28 app. at 63 (1947) (Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting).
3. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
4. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... U.S. CONST. amend. I. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the
United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment extended the protections of the Free Exercise Clause to the states. Id. at
303; see also infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
5. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). -In his dissent, Justice Blackmun lamented that the Smith II
decision "effectuates a wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the Religion
Clauses of our Constitution. One hopes that the Court is aware of the consequences
1
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Court's restriction and the inevitable consequences that
followed.
At issue in Smith II was whether the Free Exercise Clause
requires the granting of religious exemptions from generally ap-
plicable laws.' There is no dispute that the protection guaran-
teed by the Free Exercise Clause forbids governmental infringe-
ment of religious belief or opinion.7 The controversy arises,
however, when an individual's religiously motivated conduct
conflicts with a generally applicable law.' As Justice O'Connor
concluded in her concurring opinion: "a law that prohibits cer-
tain conduct - conduct that happens to be an act of worship
for someone - manifestly does prohibit that person's free exer-
cise of his religion."9 The question is which interest prevails?
Does the Free Exercise Clause mandate a religious exemption to
the law, or does the law supersede an individual's religiously mo-
tivated conduct?
Up until the Court's Smith II decision, the "compelling in-
terest test" developed by Justice Brennan in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner'° answered this critical question.'1 Under Sherbert, if an in-
dividual could show that a law burdened the exercise of his
genuine religious beliefs, the government then had to demon-
strate that the law was necessary for the accomplishment of
.... .Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 882-83.
7. Id.; see also Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303. For a discussion of the Cantwell decision,
see infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
8. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1411 (1990).
9. Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 893 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
10. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see infra notes 93-108 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989)
(granting a Christian who refused to work on Sundays an exemption from unemploy-
ment compensation rules); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136
(1987) (granting a Seventh-Day Adventist a sabbath exemption from unemployment
compensation rules); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding a
denial of religious school tax exempt status because of the university's religiously based
racial discriminatory practices); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (refusing an
exemption for an Amish employer who failed to pay social security taxes); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (granting a Jehovah's Witness, who refused an employ-
ment transfer to military tank production facility, an exemption from unemployment
compensation rules); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (exempting Amish children
from several years of compulsory state education); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971) (refusing a religious exemption for citizens only opposed to "unjust wars").
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some "compelling state interest" and that the law was the least
restrictive means to that end.12 In the Smith II opinion, the
Sherbert compelling interest test was held to be a "luxury" that
a pluralistic society cannot afford.'" Moreover, the court charac-
terized the repression of minority religions as an "unavoidable
consequence of democratic government . . . ."' The Smith II
majority replaced the Sherbert balancing test with a categorical
rule: "if prohibiting the exercise of religion is not the object of
the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applica-
ble and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not
been offended."' 5
Part II of this Note traces the historical development of the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion and the evolution
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of that right. The facts
and procedural history of Smith II are presented in Part III,
along with summaries of the majority, concurring and dissenting
opinions. Part IV contrasts the Sherbert compelling interest test
and the Smith II rule. This part also examines the implications
and consequences that flow from the Court's abandonment of
nearly thirty years of free exercise jurisprudence. Finally, this
Note supports the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1991, which would reinstate the Sherbert compelling in-
terest test.
II. Background
A. Religious Liberty in the Colonies: A Historical Perspective
Persecution of minority religious sects in Europe was in part
the driving force behind the emigration of the early settlers to
the colonies."6 In seventeenth-century Europe, the established
12. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-10.
13. Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 888.
14. Id. at 890. Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, stated that he did "not
believe the Founders thought their dearly bought freedom from religious persecution a
'luxury,' but an essential element of liberty - and they could not have thought religious
intolerance 'unavoidable,' for they drafted the Religion Clauses precisely in order to
avoid that intolerance." Id. at 909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 878; see also id. at 892 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1946). According to the Everson
majority:
The First Amendment . . . commands that a state "shall make no law respecting
1992]
3
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:403
religious sects had absolute power." In order to maintain this
supremacy and to force loyalty, these establishments imposed
taxes, jail terms, physical punishment and even death.18 These
practices became manifest in the colonies, 9 and "became so
commonplace as to shock freedom-loving colonials into a feeling
of abhorrence.
20
Consequently, there was an expanding movement toward re-
ligious liberty in the thirteen colonies, necessitated in part by
the pluralistic nature of the colonies and the successful experi-
ence in Rhode Island of providing an atmosphere of religious
unity among different sects.2'
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... These
words of the First Amendment reflected in the minds of early Americans a vivid
mental picture of conditions and practices which they fervently wished to stamp
out in order to preserve liberty for themselves and for their posterity.
Id. (citations omitted); see also SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
AMERICA 70 (1902).
17. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-9.
18. Id. at 9. For a more detailed discussion of the religious climate of Europe prior
to and contemporaneous with the colonization of America, see COBB, supra note 16.
Justice Thomas Cooley of the Supreme Court of Michigan stated in his treatise on
constitutional limitations:
WHOEVER shall examine with care the American constitutions will find noth-
ing more fully stated or more plainly expressed than the desire of their authors to
preserve and perpetuate religious liberty, and to guard against the slightest ap-
proach towards the establishment of inequality in the civil or political rights of
citizens, based upon differences of religious belief. The American people came to
the work of framing their fundamental laws after centuries of religious oppression
and persecution, sometimes by one party or sect and sometimes by another, had
taught them the utter futility of all attempts to propagate religious opinions by
the rewards, penalties, or terrors of human laws.
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 544 (3d ed. 1874).
19. Everson, 330 U.S. at 9. The Church of England was established by order of the
Crown in the colony of Virginia. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
20. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11. The Court noted that:
Madison wrote to a friend in 1774: "That diabolical, hell-conceived principle of
persecution rages among some .... This vexes me the worst of anything whatever.
There are at this time in the adjacent country not less than five or six well-mean-
ing men in close jail for publishing their religious sentiments, which in the main
are very orthodox. I have neither patience to hear, talk, or think of anything rela-
tive to this matter; for I have squabbled and scolded, abused and ridiculed, so long
about it to little purpose, that I am without common patience. So I must beg you
to pity me, and pray for liberty of conscience to all."
Id. at 11 n.9 (quoting I WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 18, 21 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900)).
21. Rodney K. Smith, Getting Off on the Wrong Foot and Back on Again: A Reex-
amination of the History of the Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss2/7
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Economic forces also contributed to the increased need for
religious cooperation "among the adherents of the various
sects."2 By the eighteenth century, a heightened level of cooper-
ation and interdependence was required to maintain colonial ec-
onomic autonomy largely due to the distance between the Amer-
ican colonies and England.23  This economic dependency
required that religious differences among the colonies be set
aside. 4
The Supreme Court, when defining the general historical
purpose of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, has
relied upon the writings of James Madison and Thomas Jeffer-
son, generated during this period of religious tolerance in late
eighteenth-century America.25 Madison played a leading role in
the historic struggle for religious liberty in Virginia.26 In prepa-
ration for secession from England, Virginia was in the process of
drafting its constitution in May 1776.27 George Mason was re-
sponsible for drafting Virginia's Declaration of Rights, which in-
cluded provisions regarding religious liberty.2 8 James Madison's
response to Mason's proposal was his first documented pro-
nouncement on the subject of religious liberty.29
ment and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
569, 575 (1984).
22. Id. at 576.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1946); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
26. Everson, 330 U.S. at 12.
27. Smith, supra note 21, at 579 n.33.
28. Id. at 579. Mason's proposal on religious liberty provided:
That as Religion, or the Duty we owe to our divine and omnipotent Creator, and
the Manner of discharging it, can be directed only by Reason and Conviction, not
by Force or Violence; and, therefore, that all Men shou'd enjoy the fullest Tolera-
tion in the Exercise of Religion, according to the Dictates of Conscience, unpun-
ished and unrestrained by the Magistrate, unless under Colour of Religion, any
Man disturb the Peace, the'Happiness, or Safety of Society, or of Individuals.
And that it is the mutual Duty of all, to practice Christian Forbearance, Love and
Charity towards Each other.
JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 51 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985) (emphasis added).
29. Smith, supra note 21, at 580. Madison's response provided:
That religion, or the duty we owe our creator, and the manner of discharging it,
being under the direction of reason and conviction only, not of violence, or com-
pulsion, all men are entitled to the full and free exercise of it according to the
19921
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The differences in the two proposals provide insight into
Madison's early stand on free exercise of religion.3 0 First,
Madison favored a broad, unfettered right to free exercise of re-
ligion, evinced by his language: "all men are entitled to the full
and free exercise . . . . "s On the other hand, Mason believed
that "all men should enjoy the fullest toleration of the exercise
of religion .... ,,32 Second, Madison proposed that government
could intervene in matters burdening the free exercise of religion
only when "under color of religion the preservation of equal lib-
erty, and the existence of the State be manifestly endangered.
33
Mason, on the other hand, favored broader grounds for free ex-
ercise limitations: "unless under color of religion any man dis-
turb the peace, happiness, or safety of society or individuals.
34
Although no court has gone as far as Madison's early proposal,
the compelling interest test seems to have come close.3 5
The movement toward religious liberty in Virginia reached
its peak in 1785 when a bill to levy a general tax supporting
Christian teachers was before the Virginia Legislature.3 James
Madison led a successful fight opposing the Bill,37 circulating his
dictates of conscience; and therefore no man or class of men ought on account of
religion be invested with particular emoluments or privileges, nor subjected to any
penalties or disabilities, unless under color of religion the preservation of equal
liberty, and the existence of the State be manifestly endangered.
Id. (emphasis modified) (citing MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTEN-
TIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 21 (1978)).
30. See id. at 580.
31. Id. at 581.
32. Id.
33. Id.; supra note 29. In analyzing these words, Professor Smith noted that
"[aipparently, only something of the magnitude of sedition or denial by one religious
group of the liberty granted another would justify government action in religious mat-
ters." Smith, supra note 21, at 582.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 583; see infra text accompanying notes 100-04. Professor Smith noted that
"the broad language in the religious guarantees of both the United States Constitution
and the state constitutions would clearly permit such an expansive reading of the free
exercise clause." Smith, supra note 21, at 583.
36. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947). For background material sur-
rounding the proposal of the Bill, see CoaB, supra note 16, at 495-97. The Bill Establish-
ing A Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion (1779) is reprinted as an appendix
to Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 28 app.
at 72 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
37. Everson, 330 U.S. at 12. At the time the Bill was introduced, James Madison
was a member of the Virginia Legislature.
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famous petition entitled "Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments."3 Mindful that "the majority may tres-
pass on the rights of the minority, '39 Madison continued to view
free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, further sug-
gesting an approach analogous to Sherbert."°
The Bill supporting Christian teachers was not only de-
feated, but Thomas Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom" was adopted. 41 Enacted by the Virginia assembly in
1786, the Bill established as law that "all men shall be free to
profess, and ... maintain, their opinions in matters of religion"
and that "the opinions of men are not the object of civil govern-
ment, nor under its jurisdiction. 42
Thomas Jefferson, however, espoused a strict distinction be-
tween belief and conduct.4 3 According to Jefferson, beliefs
should be fully protected from state control but conduct should
not.4 4 In his letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, Jefferson
wrote "that the legislative powers of government reach actions
only, and not opinions .... [M]an has no natural right in oppo-
sition to his social duties." '45 It was this distinction that the Su-
38. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
(1785), reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 28 app. at 63 (1947) (Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
40. The Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments states in part:
The religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.
This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable.., because what
is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every
man to render to the creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be
acceptable to him. This duty is precedent both in order of time and degree of
obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. We maintain therefore that in matters of
Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and Reli-
gion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.
Id. (emphasis added).
41. Everson, 330 U.S. at 12. For an account of the background and evolution of the
Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, see COBB, supra note 16, at 74-115, 494-
99.
42. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (June 12, 1779), in
2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545, 546 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950).
43. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1451.
44. Id.
45. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a committee of the Danbury Baptist Associa-
tion (Jan. 1, 1802), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332, 332
(Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944).
1992]
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preme Court would later use, holding that "[laws are made for
the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with
mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices."48
B. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
On June 8, 1789, Congressman James Madison delivered a
speech before the House of Representatives.4 7 Madison was con-
cerned that the "great mass of people who opposed [the Consti-
tution], disliked it because it did not contain effectual provisions
against encroachment on particular rights .... Madison rec-
ommended the following amendment to protect religious liberty:
"[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of reli-
gious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be estab-
lished, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any
manner, or on any pretext, infringed." '49
The House adopted in principle a version proposed by Fos-
ter Ames of Massachusetts: "Congress shall make no law estab-
lishing religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall
the rights of conscience be infringed." 50 The Senate approved a
different version: "Congress shall make no law establishing arti-
cles of faith or a mode of worship or prohibiting the free exercise
of religion . . . . " The House rejected the Senate's version.52
Madison served on the conference committee which proposed
the version of the Religion Clauses that was ultimately ratified
in 1791.53
As a result, religious liberty is now protected through two
46. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878); see also infra notes 61-62
and accompanying text.
47. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 448-59 (Joseph Gales & William W. Seaton eds., 1789).
48. Id. at 450.
49. Id. at 451. The words "rights of conscience" and "free exercise of religion" had
generally been used interchangeably by Congress in different versions of the Religious
Clauses. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1488. "Free exercise of religion" was generally con-
sidered broader, encompassing actions as well as beliefs. Id. at 1492-94. However, "rights
of conscience" was more likely to be understood as limited to opinion or belief. Id.
50. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1482. The House approval of Ames' version was
devoid of any documented debate or discussion. Id. at 1483.
51. Id. at 1483-84. The Senate's approved version was likewise devoid of any docu-
mented debate or discussion. Id. at 1483.
52. Id. at 1484.
53. Id.
[Vol. 12:403
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constitutional clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause: "Congress shall make no law respecting the es-
tablishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."5 Some commentators have argued that the broad lan-
guage used in these constitutional guarantees would seem to jus-
tify an expansive reading of the Free Exercise Clause in line
with Madison's early sentiments. 5
C. Reynolds v. United States: Beliefs v. Actions
The Supreme Court's first notable interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause came in 1878 in Reynolds v. United
States." In Reynolds, the defendant, a member of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Mormon Church), was
convicted of taking a second wife in violation of federal law
prohibiting polygamy.57 The Mormon Church imposed a duty on
its male members, "circumstances permitting, to practice polyg-
amy."58 In defense of his action, Reynolds argued that his free
exercise rights had been violated.59
Chief Justice Waite, writing for the Court, refused to over-
54. U.S. CONST. amend. I. According to Justice Black in his majority opinion in Ev-
erson v. Board of Educ., the Establishment Clause means that:
Neither a state nor the Federal government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbe-
liefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the Words of
Thomas Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was in-
tended to erect "a wall of separation between Church and State."
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (citations omitted).
55. See Smith, supra note 21, at 583.
56. 98 U.S. 145 (1878); see also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RE-
PORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
31 (1986) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT].
57. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161. Under the Morrill Act of 1862, bigamy was a crime in
the territories. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 83.
58. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161.
59. Id. at 161-62.
9
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turn Reynolds' conviction on free exercise grounds.6 0 The Court
incorporated Thomas Jefferson's early distinction between ac-
tions and opinion into its free exercise analysis and determined
that the federal polygamy prohibition was not preempted by the
Free Exercise Clause. 1 Expounding on this distinction, Chief
Justice Waite asserted that in accordance with the First Amend-
ment "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in viola-
tion of social duties or subversive of good order. 6 2
Consequently, the Reynolds Court narrowed the scope of
free exercise protection. While Congress could not restrain a
person's religious beliefs or opinions, religious acts that fur-
thered those opinions could be prohibited in furtherance of le-
gitimate secular goals.13 Using this basic standard the Court
found that although the practice of polygamy was religiously
motivated, it was offensive to the moral standards of the Union
and could therefore be regulated. 4 Criminalization of religiously
motivated polygamy withstood Reynolds' free exercise
challenge.6 5
D. The Early Demise of Reynolds
The next leading free exercise case did not arise until 1940
in Cantwell v. Connecticut." In Cantwell, Jehovah Witness de-
fendants were convicted of violating a state ordinance which re-
quired a license for soliciting money for religious causes, and of
common law breach of peace violation. 7 Under the ordinance,
before a license could be issued, a licensing official had to deter-
mine whether or not the cause was genuinely religious.6 ' The de-
60. Id. at 168.
61. Id. at 164. The Court also quoted from Jefferson's statement to the Danbury
Baptist Association about the "Wall of Separation" and expressing a belief that man
"has no natural right in opposition to his social duties." Id.; supra note 45.
62. Id.
63. Smith, supra note 21, at 635.
64. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164-65.
65. Id. at 166-67. The Reynolds Court never addressed the meaning of "free exer-
cise," but reasoned that free exercise extended to beliefs, not actions. See ATTORNEY
GENERAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 83-84 n.4.
66. 310 U.S. 296 (1940); see also ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 85.
67. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 300.
68. Id. at 305.
[Vol. 12:403
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fendants had been arrested while going from house to house
soliciting contributions for religious pamphlets.69 They chal-
lenged their subsequent convictions on free exercise grounds.70
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, held that the ordi-
nance deprived the defendants of their Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process of law.71 This was the first time the Court
expressly extended the free exercise protections of the First
Amendment to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. 72
However, the Court refused to rely solely on the Free Exercise
Clause to strike down the ordinance.73 Additionally, the Court
incorporated Justice Holmes' "clear and present danger test"
from Schenck v. United States, 7  and held that the licensing
provision was an unconstitutional infringement on free speech."
69. Id. at 301. The case arose when the defendants stopped two men on the street,
asked and received permission to play a religious phonograph record for them. Id. at
302-03. The record contained material which attacked the two men's religion (Roman
Catholic). Id. at 303. Both men were riled by the record and threatened to strike the
defendants unless they went away. Id. The defendants promptly left. Id.
70. Id. at 300-01.
71. Id. at 303. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that:
"No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303. The Court stated that: "The First Amendment de-
clares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures
of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws." Id.
73. Id. at 307. Until 1961 the Supreme Court continued to afford free exercise pro-
tection in the context of other First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290 (1951) (invalidating the state ordinance requiring a permit to hold public wor-
ship on the streets); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(invalidating the state law requiring children to salute the flag at public schools).
74. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Justice Holmes' "clear and present danger" test provided
that: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circum-
stances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Id. at 52.
75. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311. The unanimous Court reasoned that:.
Although the contents of the [phonographic] record not unnaturally aroused
animosity, we think that, in the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define and
punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial
interest of the State, the [defendants'] communication, considered in the light of
the constitutional guarantees, raised no such clear and present menace to public
peace and order as to render him liable to conviction of the common law offense in
question.
Id.
The Court did, however, reiterate the distinction between the absolute freedom to
believe, and the less than absolute freedom to act: "Thus the Amendment embraces two
11
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The Supreme Court took a novel approach to free exercise
jurisprudence in Braunfeld v. Brown.76 The claimants, a group
of Orthodox Jewish shop owners, brought suit to enjoin Pennsyl-
vania's mandatory Sunday closing statute as applied to them.7
A basic tenet of the Jewish faith required these shop owners to
close their shops on Saturdays, their sabbath.7 8 Prior to the en-
actment of the Sunday closing statute, the claimants were able
to compensate for closing on Saturdays by remaining open on
Sundays, a day in which they did a substantial amount of
business. 9
The Jewish shop owners attacked the statute on free exer-
cise grounds claiming it forced them to choose between eco-
nomic hardship (state mandated Sunday closing) and obser-
vance of their religion (religiously mandated Saturday closing).8
The Court sustained the law as applied to the claimants by la-
beling the religious burden as "indirect." '81 The Court reasoned
that an indirect burden operates less restrictively on an individ-
ual's free exercise than a law which makes "unlawful the reli-
gious practice itself."82 The Court proclaimed that legislation
which somehow put one religion at an economic disadvantage
was an inevitable consequence of a "cosmopolitan nation. '83
Nevertheless, the Court held that such an effect cannot be used
as an "absolute test" in determining whether legislation violates
an individual's right to free exercise of religion."4 According to
concepts, - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, . . the
second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society."
Id. at 303-04.
76. 366 U.S. 599 (1961); see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Bur-
dens of the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 940 (1989).
77. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601.
78. Id. at 602.
79. Id. at 601.
80. Id. at 601-02.
81. Id. at 606. The Court emphasized the noncoercive nature of the statute: "[Tihe
statute at bar does not make unlawful any religious practices of the [the claimants]; the
Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and, as applied to [the claimants], oper-
ates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive." Id. at 605.
82. Id. at 606. The Court stated that: "To strike down, without the most critical
scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion,
i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically
restrict the operating latitude of the legislature." Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 606-07,
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the Court, some limitation must be placed upon legislation that
imposes only an indirect burden on religious observance.85
Thus, the Supreme Court's analysis did not end once it
characterized the claimant's burden as indirect or direct. In-
stead, the Court then examined the state's interest in providing
a Sunday closing law, whether the law had a secular purpose,
and whether a less burdensome alternative could accomplish the
same end.86 After careful analysis the Court determined that the
state had a legitimate secular interest in maintaining one uni-
form day of rest 87 and could not achieve its goal through less
restrictive means.8 8 The Court concluded that the state would
encounter substantial enforcement problems if it created reli-
gious exemptions.8 9 Consequently, the statute was upheld. 0
Although the Court rejected the free exercise claim, its ap-
proach was a dramatic departure from Reynolds."1 In effect,
Braunfeld widened the scope of the Free Exercise Clause by
placing indirect burdens within its scrutiny and requiring the
85. The Court held that:
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all
religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitu-
tionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indi-
rect. But if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power,
the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute
is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may
accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden.
Id. at 607. The Court turned to CantweU as support for requiring the state to employ the
least restrictive means in furthering its interests:
If the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the pur-
pose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid
despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may accom-
plish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden.
Id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1940)).
86. Id. at 606-07.
87. Id. at 607.
88. Id. at 608. The Court reasoned that:
[T]o permit the exemption might well undermine the State's goal of providing a
day that, as best possible, eliminates the atmosphere of commercial noise and ac-
tivity. Although not dispositive of the issue, enforcement problems would be more
difficult since there would be two or more days to police rather than one and it
would be more difficult to observe whether violations were occurring.
Id.
89. Id. at 608-09.
90. Id. at 609.
91. Lupu, supra note 76, at 940.
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state to justify them. 2
E. Sherbert v. Verner: Expansion of Religious Liberty
Through The Compelling Interest Test
Before Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith (Smith H),93 Sherbert v. Verner94 was gener-
ally considered the leading case in the Supreme Court's modern
approach to free exercise jurisprudence.96 In Sherbert, a South
Carolina employer discharged the claimant, a Seventh-Day Ad-
ventist, because she refused to work on Saturdays, her Sab-
bath.96 Unable to find other employment because of her refusal
to work on Saturdays, the claimant applied for unemployment
benefits.9 7 The South Carolina Employment Security Commis-
sion denied her application on the ground that she remained un-
employed without "good cause."9 8 The South Carolina courts af-
firmed, rejecting her free exercise claim.99
The Supreme Court reversed, recognizing that government
burdens the free exercise of religion when it denies unemploy-
ment benefits to an individual because of conduct mandated by
religious belief. 100 The Court's free exercise analysis consisted of
a two-part balancing test. The first part centers on whether the
application of the statute imposes a burden upon the free exer-
cise of the claimant's religion. 10 If the statute imposes a burden
92. Id.
93. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a detailed discussion of the Smith 11 majority opinion,
see infra notes 169-84 and accompanying text.
94. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
95. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1412.
96. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399. The unemployment regulation provided in pertinent
part: "Conditions for eligibility for benefits. - An unemployed insured worker shall be
eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if: . . . (3) he is able to work and
is available to work .... Id. at 400 n.3.
97. Id. at 399-400.
98. Id. at 401.
99. Id. The Court noted that:
The State Supreme Court held specifically that appellant's ineligibility infringed
no constitutional liberties because such a construction of the statute "places no
restriction upon the appellant's freedom of religion nor does it in any way prevent
her in the exercise of her right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in
accordance with the dictates of her conscience."
Id. (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 410.
101. Id. at 403.
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on the claimant's free exercise, the second part of the test calls
for a consideration of whether some "compelling state interest"
justifies the infringement.0 2 Even if the state's interest is com-
pelling, that interest would be outweighed if it could have been
achieved through less restrictive means."°3 At the same time, the
Court recognized that if religiously motivated conduct "posed
some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order," free
exercise challenges would be rejected. 04
The Court found that even though the state had a legiti-
mate interest in limiting unemployment benefits, that interest
was not compelling when weighed against the burden on claim-
ant's free exercise of religion.0 5 According to Justice Brennan,
"only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests give
occasion for permissible limitation.' 0 6Before Smith II, the Sherbert compelling interest test had
been widely used by both state and federal courts when con-
fronted with challenges to legislation that burdened religious
exercise.0 7
102. Id. at 403, 406.
103. Id. at 407.
104. Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 406-08. In assessing whether the State's interest was compelling, the
Court noted that:
No such abuse or danger has been advanced in the present case. The [State] sug-
gest[s] no more than a possibility that the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupu-
lous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work might not only dilute
the unemployment compensation fund but also hinder the scheduling by employ-
ers of necessary Saturday work. But that possibility is not apposite here because
no such objection appears to have been made before the South Carolina Supreme
Court, and we are unwilling to assess the importance of an asserted state interest
without views of the state court. Nor, if the contention had been made below,
would the record appear to sustain it; there is no proof whatever to warrant such
fears of malingering or deceit as those which the [State] now advance[s].
Id. at 407.
106. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
107. Federal decisions applying the compelling interest test include: Dole v. Shenan-
doah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131 (1990) (refus-
ing a free exercise exemption for a religious school to Fair Labor Standards Act); Minker
v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (holding that the maintenance of a minister's age discrimination suit against
church would violate the Free Exercise Clause); Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City
and County of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the denial of a
zoning variance does not violate the Free Exercise Clause); Islamic Ctr. v. Starkville, 840
F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that denial of a zoning variance for a Moslem mosque
violated the Free Exercise Clause); Church of God v. Amarillo Indep. School Dist., 511 F.
15
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Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has relied on Sherbert on
several occasions.108 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,109 Amish parents
challenged Wisconsin's compulsory education law. The parents
argued that allowing their children to attend high school would,
among other things, "endanger their own salvation and that of
their children:"110 Faced with this religious challenge to the
state's compulsory school attendance law, the Court held that
enforcement would "gravely endanger if not destroy the free ex-
ercise rights of the Amish religious beliefs.""' The Court stated
that in order to compel school attendance it must appear "that
there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the
interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause." '12
In United States v. Lee,1 3 the Court held that an Old Or-
der Amish farmer and carpenter had to pay employer's social
security taxes, and also withhold social security taxes from his
Amish employees." 4 Using the Sherbert test the Court found
that even though the payment of taxes violated Lee's religious
beliefs, creating an exemption would undermine the social secur-
ity system." 6
Supp. 613 (N.D. Tex. 1981), aff'd, 670 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that Church of
God students could not be penalized for school absences during "Holy Week").
State court decisions applying the compelling interest test include: Barlow v. Black-
burn, 798 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding no right to practice polygamy); First
Covenant Church v. Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991)
(holding that state landmark ordinances as applied to church violated the Free Exercise
Clause); State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990) (holding that a child abuse
reporting statute as applied to religious counselors did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause); Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 1989) (holding
that there exists a possible free exercise right for a student to be excused from state
mandated curriculum on AIDS prevention); Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. An-
drews, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1346 (1989) (holding that illegal medical practices, although
religiously prescribed, are not protected by the Free Exercise Clause).
108. See supra note 11.
109. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
110. Id. at 209.
111. Id. at 219.
112. Id. at 214.
113. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
114. Id. at 261.
115. Id. at 258-60. The Lee Court stated that "[blecause the broad public interest in
maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with
the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax." Id. at 260. Indeed, govern-
mental interest in collecting taxes has traditionally been found compelling when weighed
against religious challenges. See, e.g., Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (rejecting
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Finally, in Bob Jones University v. United States,116 the
claimant, a nonprofit private university, was denied tax exempt
status because of its racially discriminatory admissions policy.1 '7
The university claimed that the denial of tax benefits burdened
its right to free exercise." 8 The Supreme Court, using the Sher-
bert compelling interest test, found that the government's inter-
est in eradicating racial discrimination was compelling, and that
this interest "substantially outweigh[ed]" the purported burden
the denial of tax benefits would have on the school's religious
exercise.119
III. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith
A. The Facts
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith (Smith I/),12O involved respondents Alfred L. Smith, a
sixty-six year old Klamath Indian, 2 ' and Galen W. Black 22 who
were both members of the Native American Church (NAC). 2 3
free exercise challenge to payment of income taxes alleged to make participation in reli-
gious activities more difficult).
116. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
117. Id. at 581-82.
118. Id. at 582.
119. Id. at 603-04.
120. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
121. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 721 P.2d 445, 446 (Or.
1986).
122. Black is not an American Indian. The sincerity of respondents' religious beliefs,
however, was not an issue before the Court. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Re-
sources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 663 (1988) (Smith I).
123. Smith II, 494 U.S. at 874. In their Amici Curiae Brief submitted on behalf of
the respondents, the Association of American Indian Affairs described the origins and
tenets of the Native American Church:
The Peyote Religion, or Peyotism, is one of the oldest continuously practiced
religions in the Western Hemisphere. Its roots have been documented back at
least ten thousand years before the discovery of the North American continent, to
the aboriginal people of the lower Rio Grande River in the continental United
States and Mexico who were familiar with peyote and its spiritual qualities.
The Native American Church ("NAC"), comprised of the national organiza-
tion and numerous state and local chapters, is the contemporary embodiment of
the Peyote Religion. Non-Indians [like respondent Black] are practicing members
of some church chapters, but many chapters restrict membership to persons of
Indian descent.
17
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The respondents were drug and alcohol counselors, employed by
Douglas County Council on Alcoholic and Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Treatment (ADAPT), a private, nonprofit substance
abuse treatment organization.12 To assure that its counselors
were appropriate role models, ADAPT's personnel policy strictly
prohibited the use of alcohol or illegal drugs by its employees. 25
Black consumed a small quantity of peyote126 at an NAC
ceremony. '27 Convinced that he relapsed into drug abuse,
Peyote is the central sacrament of NAC ceremonies; without peyote Church
ceremonies simply could not take place. Peyote is believed to embody a spiritual
deity; and the ingestion of the peyote assists participants in communicating di-
rectly with the Creator.
Brief Amici Curiae by Association on American Indian Affairs, for respondents at 7-8,
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (No. 88-
1213); see also People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1964) (granting an exemption
for NAC members from California's drug laws for religious peyote use).
124. Smith I, 485 U.S. at 662. The Court noted that both respondents "were quali-
fied to be counselors, in part, because they had former drug and alcohol dependencies."
Id.
125. Id. at 662 n.3. ADAPT's personnel policy provided in pertinent part:
POLICY STATEMENT
ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG USE BY EMPLOYEES
In keeping with our drug-free philosophy of treatment, and our belief in the dis-
ease concept of alcoholism, and associated complex issues involved in both alco-
holism and drug addiction, we require the following of our employees:
1. Use of an illegal drug or use of prescription drugs in a nonprescribed manner is
grounds for immediate termination from employment.
Id.
126. Id. at 663. In granting an exception to NAC members to California's drug laws
for religious peyote use, the California Supreme Court described peyote as follows:
The plant Lophophora williamsii, a small, spineless cactus, found in the Rio
Grande Valley of Texas and northern Mexico, produces peyote, which grows in
small buttons on the top of the cactus. Peyote's principal constituent is mescaline.
When taken internally by chewing the buttons or drinking a derivative tea, peyote
produces several types of hallucinations, depending primarily upon the user. In
most subjects it causes extraordinary vision marked by bright and kaleidoscopic
colors, geometric patterns, or scenes involving humans and animals. In others it
engenders hallucinatory symptoms similar to those produced in cases of schizo-
phrenia, dementia praecox, or paranoia. Beyond its hallucinatory effect, peyote
renders for most users a heightened sense of comprehension: it fosters a feeling of
friendliness toward other persons.
People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 816-17 (Cal. 1964).
127. Smith I, 485 U.S. at 663. In Woody, Justice Tobriner of the Supreme Court of
California described in general terms a typical Native American Church ceremony:
The "meeting," a ceremony marked by the sacramental use of peyote, com-
poses the cornerstone of the peyote religion. The meeting convenes in an enclosure
and continues from sundown Saturday to sunrise Sunday. To give thanks for the
past good fortune or find guidance for future conduct, a member will "sponsor" a
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Black's supervisor gave him a choice between "resignation, dis-
charge or entry into an inpatient treatment program.""2 8 Black
rejected the offer of treatment, insisting his use of peyote was
not a relapse, and was subsequently discharged. 29
In Smith's case, ADAPT's executive director, John Gardin,
had warned Smith that "he could be discharged for using peyote
even if the use was part of a religious ceremony."' 30 Prior to the
next NAC ceremony, Gardin talked to Smith about the events
scheduled for that weekend.' Although Gardin had no objec-
tion to Smith's attendance, he warned Smith that ingestion of
peyote, even though religiously motivated, would lead to his dis-
missal. 3 12 Nonetheless, that weekend Smith ingested a small
quantity of peyote at the ceremony. s Upon returning to work
on Monday, Smith told Gardin about his peyote use, refused
Gardin's request to enter a treatment program, and was dis-
charged later that day. 3 Subsequently, Smith and Black filed
for unemployment benefits. 35
meeting and supply to those who attend both the peyote and the next mornings
breakfast.... A meeting connotes a solemn and special occasion. Whole families
attend together, although children and young women participate only by their
presence .... At the meeting members pray, sing, and make ritual use of drum,
fan, eagle bone, whistle, rattle and prayer cigarette, the symbolic emblems of their
faith. The center event, of course, consists of the use of peyote in quantities suffi-
cient to produce an hallucinatory state.
At an early but fixed stage in the ritual the members pass around a ceremo-
nial bag of peyote buttons. Each adult may take four, the customary number, or
take none. The participants chew the buttons, usually with some difficulty because
of the extreme bitterness; later, at a set time in the ceremony any member may
ask for more peyote; occasionally a member may take as many as four more but-
tons. At sunrise on Sunday the ritual ends: after a brief outdoor prayer, the host
and his family serve breakfast. Then the members depart. By morning the effects
of the peyote disappear; the users suffer no aftereffects.
Woody, 394 P.2d at 817.
128. Black v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 721 P.2d 451, 452 (Or.
1986).
129. Id.
130. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 721 P.2d 445, 446 (Or.
1986).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 663
(1988) (Smith D.
1992]
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B. The State Administrative Proceedings
The petitioner, Oregon Employment Division, denied the
respondents' applications for unemployment compensation 5 6 on
the ground that they were discharged for work related "miscon-
duct. 1 37 After separate hearings at the respondents' request, the
referees found that they were both entitled to benefits. 13 8 The
referee found that Black's peyote use was not misconduct, but
merely "an isolated incident of poor judgment." 3 ' In Smith's
case the referee found that "although Smith had committed mis-
conduct, he was not disqualified from receiving benefits" be-
cause the state's interest in preserving the unemployment com-
pensation trust fund was outweighed by Smith's First
Amendment right to freedom of religion.'"
The Employment Appeals Board (EAB) reversed both
cases."4 As to Smith, the EAB found that the referee errone-
ously relied on the state's interest in the financial aspects of the
trust fund, rather than the "compelling" state interest in illegal
drug enforcement."" In Black's case, the EAB simply reversed
the referee's finding of no misconduct."' s
C. The Oregon Court Decisions
The Court of Appeals of Oregon, sitting en banc, reversed
the EAB's decisions. 44 In Black v. Employment Division,45 the
136. Although the Supreme Court ultimately consolidated respondents' cases in
Smith I, the cases proceeded separately through the administrative proceedings and
through the Oregon courts. Id. at 663 n.4.
137. Id. at 666 n.5.; see also supra note 125 and accompanying text. The Employ-
ment Division based its decision on: (1) an Oregon Statute which provided that "[a]n
individual shall be disqualified from the receipt of benefits ... if the authorized repre-
sentative . . . finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct connected
with work .... " OR. REV. STAT. § 657.176(2)(a) (1987); and (2) an Oregon Administrative
Rule which defines misconduct as "a willful violation of the standards of behavior which
an employer has the right to expect of an employee," OR. ADMIN. R. 471-30-038(3) (1986).
Smith I, 485 U.S. at 663-64.
138. Smith I, 485 U.S. at 663 n.5.
139. Id.
140. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 721 P.2d 445, 446 (Or.
1986).
141. Smith 1, 485 U.S. at 663 n.5.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 664.
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majority applied the compelling interest test set forth in Sher-
bert v. Verner,'" and concluded that the denial of unemploy-
ment benefits was an unconstitutional burden on the free exer-
cise of religion. 7 The court found that the state's interest in the
financial integrity of the trust fund was not compelling.14 8 How-
ever, the court was not satisfied with the fact finding below and
remanded the case to the EAB to determine the religious sincer-
ity of Black's peyote use. 4 9 Smith's case was also reversed and
was remanded for reconsideration in light of Black.150
The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed, but held that the
remand to the EAB was unnecessary.' 51 In Black's case, the
court supported its position by verifying the sincerity of the
NAC and its religious use of peyote as a sacrament.11 2 The court
fully analyzed the constitutional issues only in Smith's case.' 53
The court recognized that: (1) the Native American Church
is a bona fide religion; (2) peyote is a sacrament of the church;
and (3) the claimant was a member and active participant in the
religious ceremonies of the church. 54 Consequently, the court
found that under the compelling interest test established in
Sherbert v. Verner,15 5 the state's interest in the economic viabil-
ity of the employment compensation fund was not "compelling"
when weighed against the claimants' free exercise rights.' 6
145. 707 P.2d 1274 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
146. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). For an explanation of the Sherbert compelling interest
test, see supra text accompanying notes 100-04.
147. Black, 707 P.2d at 1277-78.
148. Id. at 1278.
149. Id. at 1279-80.
150. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 709 P.2d 246 (Or. Ct.
App. 1985).
151. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 721 P.2d 445, 446 (Or.
1986). The two cases were argued together but the court filed separate opinions.
152. Black v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 721 P.2d. 451 (Or.
1986). In Black, the court quoted extensively from People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal.
1964), to support its position. For a discussion of the Woody decision, see infra note 160.
153. Smith, 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986).
154. Black, 721 P.2d at 453.
155. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
156. Smith, 721 P.2d at 450-51. The court first determined that the denial of bene-
fits did not violate the Oregon Constitution. Id. at 446-49. In applying the compelling
interest test, the court reasoned that the state's interest in denying unemployment bene-
fits must come from the statute under attack, the Oregon unemployment statute, and
not the state criminal drug statute. Moreover, the court noted that because an illegal act
19921
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D. Smith I
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.1 57 In
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith (Smith /),'s an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court va-
cated judgment and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of
Oregon for determination of whether religious use of peyote is
illegal under Oregon law." 9 The Court reasoned that the Su-
preme Court of Oregon, in Black, relied on People v. Woody, 160
thus raising the question of whether Oregon, like California, had
created an exemption to the state's drug laws for religious pe-
yote use.1"'
The Court held that the "legality of the religious use of pe-
yote in Oregon" would determine whether it was protected by
the Constitution.'62 According to the decision in Smith I, Sher-
in and of itself is not grounds for discharge, the legality of the respondent's peyote use
was irrelevant. Id. at 450.
157. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 480 U.S. 916 (1987).
158. 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
159. Id. at 674. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor and Scalia
joined in the majority opinion. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun dissented. Jus-
tice Kennedy took no part in the opinion.
160. 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964). Woody involved a group of Navajo Indians who were
arrested during a NAC ceremony, and subsequently convicted, for possession of peyote.
Id. at 814. The Supreme Court of California, relying on Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963), created an exception to the state's narcotic laws for religious use of peyote by
NAC members. Woody, 394 P.2d at 815; see also supra note 127 (describing religious
peyote use). The court reviewed the long history of the peyote religion and recognized
that "[p]eyote constitutes in itself an object of worship; prayers are directed to it as
much as prayers are devoted to the Holy Ghost." Woody, 394 P.2d at 817. In light of an
individual's right to free exercise and the burden on his religion in applying criminal
laws to the defendant, the court weighed the state's interest in criminalization, and
found that "the use of peyote presents only a slight danger to the state and to the en-
forcement of its criminal laws .... " Id. at 817.
161. Smith I, 485 U.S. at 667-68. The Court stated that:
The possibility that respondents' conduct would be unprotected if it violated the
State's criminal code is, however, sufficient to counsel against affirming the state's
holding that the Federal Constitution requires the award of benefits to these re-
spondents. If the Oregon Supreme Court's holding rests on the unstated premise
that respondents' conduct is entitled to the same measure of federal constitutional
protection regardless of its criminality, that holding is erroneous. If, on the other
hand, it rests on the unstated premise that the conduct is not unlawful in Oregon,
the explanation of that premise would make it more difficult to distinguish our
holdings in Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie.
Id. at 673-74.
162. Id. at 673.
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bert and its progeny would be dispositive only if Smith's con-
duct had been legal."' 3 Because the First Amendment protects
only "legitimate" claims to the exercise of religious freedom, the
Court questioned the extension of that protection to conduct
validly proscribed by the State."" Consequently, the Court con-
cluded that a state could deny unemployment benefits to indi-
viduals who engaged in illegal conduct which was religiously mo-
tivated. '65 The Court vacated the judgment of the Oregon
Supreme Court and remanded the case for a determination of
the legality of peyote use ih religious ceremonies in Oregon.'
6 6
E. The Remand to the Supreme Court of Oregon
On remand, the Supreme Court of Oregon concluded that
"the Oregon statute against possession of controlled substances
which includes peyote makes no exception for sacramental use
of peyote, but that outright prohibition of good faith religious
use of peyote by adult members of the Native American Church
would violate the First Amendment directly and as interpreted
by Congress." '67 The court basically reaffirmed its prior holding
163. Id. at 673-74.
164. Id. at 671.
165. Id. According to the Court, the First Amendment only protects "'legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion' ... [and] does not extend to conduct that the state
has validly proscribed." Id. (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeal Comm'n, 480 U.S.
136, 142 (1987)). The Court implied that the free exercise analysis used in Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), should control religiously motivated illegal conduct.
Id. For a full discussion of the Reynolds decision, see supra notes 56-65 and accompany-
ing text.
Professor Smith, in his critique of Reynolds, opined that the "Reynolds Court inter-
preted the free exercise right as a privilege. While Congress could not forbid anyone from
forming religious opinions, religious acts that furthered those opinions could be withheld
at the whim of the government in the interests of 'good order.'" Smith, supra note 21, at
635.
166. Smith I, 485 U.S. at 674.
167. Smith v. Employment Div., 763 P.2d 146, 148 (Or. 1988). The court cited the
American Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978), in defense of its
position:
Henceforth it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for
American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise
the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native
Hawaiians including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sa-
cred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonial and traditional rites.
Smith, 763 P.2d at 149 (citation omitted). Additionally, the court examined the report of
the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d
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that "the First Amendment entitled petitioners to unemploy-
ment compensation. '" 168
F. The United States Supreme Court Decision in Smith II
On petition by the Employment Division Department of
Human Resources of Oregon, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari 69 for a second time to decide the question of whether "the
Free Exercise Clause . . . permits . . . Oregon to include relig-
iously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general crimi-
nal prohibition on the use of that drug, and thus permits the
State to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from
their jobs because of such religiously inspired use. '1 70 The
United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Su-
preme Court of Oregon and held that the Free Exercise Clause
does not prevent the state from prohibiting sacramental peyote
use in a bona fide NAC ceremony. 71
Sess. 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1262, which accompanied the Act. With
respect to restrictions on the use of peyote, the report concluded that "[a]lthough acts of
Congress prohibit the use of peyote as a hallucinogen, it is established Federal law that
peyote is constitutionally protected when used by a bona fide religion as a sacrament."
Id. at 1263. Moreover, the court noted that twenty-three states have statutorily ex-
empted religious peyote use by the Native American Church from criminal prosecution.
Smith, 763 P.2d at 148 n.2.
In response to the Smith II decision, Oregon revised its drug prohibition in 1991
providing an affirmative defense for good faith religious use of peyote. The revised stat-
ute reads:
(5) In any prosecution under this section for manufacture, possession or deliv-
ery of that plant of the genus Lophophora commonly known as peyote, it is an
affirmative defense that the peyote is being used or is intended for use:
(a) In connection with the good faith practice of a religious belief;
(b) As directly associated with a religious practice; and
(c) In a manner that is not dangerous to the health of the user or others who
are in the proximity of the user.
OR. REv. STAT. § 475.992(5) (1991).
168. Smith, 763 P.2d at 148; see supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
169. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
170. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874
(1990) (Smith I).
171. Id. at 875-90.
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G. The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia 172 narrowly con-
strued the Free Exercise Clause as applied to religiously moti-
vated conduct: "if prohibiting the exercise of religion is not the
object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally
applicable provision, the First Amendment has not been of-
fended. ' 173 Since the Oregon statute prohibiting peyote was not
specifically directed at the respondents' religious practice, the
majority concluded that the principles set forth in Reynolds v.
United States were controlling. 17' According to Justice Scalia,
the Supreme Court has "never held that an individual's religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. 17
The Court distinguished leading free exercise cases such as
Cantwell v. Connecticut,1716 Wisconsin v. Yoder,177 and West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette1 78 by labeling them as
"hybrid. 1 79 Moreover, the Court abandoned the Sherbert com-
pelling interest test when faced with a religious challenge to
172. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy joined in
the majority opinion. Justice O'Connor concurred in their judgment, with whom Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined as to Parts I and II. Justices Blackmun, Bren-
nan, and Marshall dissented.
173. Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 878.
174. Id. at 882. Justice Scalia stated that "[t]here being no contention that Oregon's
drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of reli-
gious beliefs, or the raising of one's children in those beliefs, the rule to which we have
adhered ever since Reynolds plainly controls." Id. For a discussion of the Reynolds deci-
sion, see supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
175. Smith I, 494 U.S. at 878-79. Contra Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(creating a free exercise exemption from several years of compulsory state education for
Amish children).
176. 310 U.S. 296 (1940); see supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
177. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
178. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Barnette, when faced with a religious challenge to a
1941 West Virginia statute requiring compulsory participation by school children in the
pledge of allegiance, the Supreme Court ruled that enforcement of the statute "invade[df]
the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from all official control." Id. at 642.
179. Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 881-82. The Court found that each of these cases
presented not only issues relative to the Free Exercise Clause, but involved the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with such other constitutionally protected rights as free-
dom of speech and of the press. The Court continued by noting that the Free Exercise
Clause might also be raised with the issue of freedom of association when groups form in
an attempt to protect their religious practices. Id.
25
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"generally applicable prohibitions.1 ,80 The Court implied that
the compelling interest test might still be valid in "hybrid" cases
which involve the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections,1 81 and in the narrow context of
unemployment compensation cases where the conduct sought to
be controlled is legal. 18 2 Finally, the Smith H majority viewed
repression of minority religions as an "unavoidable consequence
of democratic government"' 83 and consequently denied the re-
spondents unemployment compensation because of their reli-
gious practices.""4
180. Id. at 885. The Court stated that "[tlo make an individual's obligation to obey
such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where
the State's interest is 'compelling' - permitting him by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become
a law unto himself,' - contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense." Id.
at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)).
In countering this argument, Justice O'Connor noted in her concurring opinion, that
the Court's "free exercise cases have all concerned generally applicable laws that had the
effect of significantly burdening religious practice." Id. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
Justice Scalia further stated that:
Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unem-
.ployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a
generally applicable criminal law. The Sherbert test, it must be recalled, was de-
veloped in a context that lent itself to individualized government assessment of
the reasons for relevant conduct.
Id. at 884.
181. Id. at 881-82.
182. Id. at 883-84. The Court stated that "[iun recent years we have abstained from
applying the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment compensation field) at all." Id. at
883. For cases that applied the Sherbert compelling interest test in the context of unem-
ployment compensation where the conduct at issue was legal, see Hobbie v. Unemploy-
ment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (granting a Seventh-Day Adventist a Sab-
bath exemption from unemployment compensation rules); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707 (1981) (granting a Jehovah's Witness, who refused an employment transfer to
military tank production facility, an exemption from unemployment compensation
rules).
183. Smith H, 494 U.S. at 890.
184. Id. The Court noted that:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place
at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in;
but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to
a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
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H. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Although Justice O'Connor concurred in the majority's
judgment, she attacked the abandonment of the compelling in-
terest test as "denigrate" to the purpose of the Bill of Rights. 186
Additionally, Justice O'Connor questioned the "vitality" of the
Free Exercise Clause as construed by the majority - covering
only the unlikely scenario in which a state directly targets a reli-
gious practice. 186 She labeled this "dramatic depart[ure] from
well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence" as being "incom-
-patible with our Nation's fundamental commitment to individ-
ual religious liberty,' ' 8 7 and urged the continued application of
the Sherbert compelling interest test in "paradigm free exercise
cases."'
88
Justice O'Connor concluded by applying the compelling in-
terest test to the facts of the case.' 89 She found that although
Oregon's peyote prohibition "places a severe burden on the abil-
ity of respondents to freely exercise their religion,"' 9 accommo-
dating a religious exemption in this case would "seriously impair
Oregon's compelling interest in prohibiting possession of peyote
by its citizens."''
185. Id. at 903 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In reproaching the majority's abandon-
ment of the Sherbert test, Justice O'Connor stated that:
[T]he Court holds that where the law is a generally applicable criminal prohibi-
tion, our usual free exercise jurisprudence does not even apply. To reach this
sweeping result, however, the Court must not only give a strained reading of the
First Amendment but must also disregard our consistent application of free exer-
cise doctrine to cases involving generally applicable regulations that burden reli-
gious conduct.
Id. at 892 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor stated further that "[blecause the First
Amendment does not distinguish between religious belief and religious conduct, conduct
motivated by sincere religious belief, like the belief itself, must therefore be at least pre-
sumptively protected by the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 893.
186. Id. at 894.
187. Id. at 891.
188. Id. at 901. Justice O'Connor characterized the compelling interest as "effec-
tuat[ing] the First Amendment's command that religious liberty is an independent lib-
erty, that it occupies a preferred position, and that the Court will not permit encroach-
ments upon this liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless required by clear and
compelling governmental interests 'of the highest order.'" Id. at 895 (quoting Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
189. Id. at 903-07.
190. Id. at 903.
191. Id. at 906. In balancing the compelling interest test in favor of the state, Jus-
1992]
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I. The Dissent
The dissent, written by Justice Blackmun, agreed with Jus-
tice O'Connor's evaluation of the majority's narrow rule and her
adherence to the compelling interest test.192 The dissent took is-
sue, however, with Justice O'Connor's broad assessment of the
compelling state interest at issue.'93 Joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, Justice Blackmun found that the competing inter-
ests must be reduced to the "same plane of generality" to avoid
"distort[ing] the weighing process in the state's favor."'I9 Conse-
quently, the dissent found the state's interest to be the "enforce-
ment of its [peyote] prohibition.' ' 95 As such, the dissent rea-
soned that given Oregon's refusal to enforce this prohibition
against any religious use of peyote, no compelling interest can be
asserted.'96 Justice Blackmun asserted that Oregon: (1) "had not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing its drug laws against
religious users of peyote"; (2) "never sought to prosecute respon-
dents"; and (3) had "not claimed to [make] significant enforce-
.ment efforts against other religious users of peyote."' 97 Thus, the
dissent found the State's interest to be only symbolic and not
rising to a level which would support a restriction on religious
freedom.' 98
Additionally, the dissent took issue with the petitioner's
other proclaimed interests.'9 9 First, as to the protection of its
citizens from the resulting harmful effects of using peyote, the
dissent noted that no evidence was offered by the petitioner to
support this proposition.2 0 Justice Blackmun noted that the
federal government, which created an exemption for religious
peyote use,2"' apparently did not find peyote inherently
tice O'Connor was mainly concerned with the resultant physical harm of using controlled
substances and the societal interest in preventing drug trafficking. Id.
192. Id. at 908-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 909-10.
194. Id. at 910.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 910-911.
197. Id. at 911.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 911-19.
200. Id. at 911-12.
201. Religious peyote use by NAC members is exempt from federal drug laws:
The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the
[Vol. 12:403
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dangerous. 02
Second, as to the state's interest in "abolishing drug traf-
ficking," the dissent noted that there is "practically no illegal
traffic in peyote" because it is "not a popular drug."2 '' Conse-
quently, the dissent found that the distribution of peyote for re-
ligious rituals had no correlation with the "vast and violent traf-
fic in illegal narcotics that plagues this country."204 Third, as to
the claim that granting an exemption for religious peyote use
will open the flood gates to other claims for religious drug ex-
emptions, the dissent pointed out that "[t]his argument could be
made ... in almost any free exercise case.' 205 Justice Blackmun
noted that nearly half the states have "maintained an exemption
for religious peyote use for many years" ''"6 and there is no indi-
cation that they have been overwhelmed with other religious
claims.20 7
Finally, the dissent argued that if Oregon can constitution-
ally prosecute respondents for this "act of worship," they might
be forced to leave the state for a more tolerant one. 0 8 According
to Justice Blackmun, this "potentially devastating impact must
be viewed in light of the federal policy" articulated in the Amer-
ican Indian Religious Freedom Act which mandates special pro-
tection for Native American religions and their ceremonies.0 9
nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American
Church, and members of the Native American Church so using peyote are exempt
from registration.
Food and Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1985).
202. Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 912 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 916.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 916-17.
206. Id. at 917.
207. Id. Justice Blackmun also pointed out that the state would hot be obligated to
grant similar exemptions to other religious groups due to the unique circumstances re-
garding the NAC and its ceremonies. Id. at 917-18; see also supra note 127 (describing a
NAC ceremony).
208. Id. at 920.
209. Id. at 920-21. The American Religious Freedom Act provides:
Henceforth it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for
American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise
the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native
Hawaiians including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sa-
cred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonial and traditional rites.
42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978 & Supp. 1991).
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IV. Analysis
A. The Original Meaning and Stare Decisis: The Missing
Ingredients
The Supreme Court has never fully examined the historical
context or original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.2"' The
Court's free exercise cases, in particular Sherbert v. Verner21'
and its progeny,"' and Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith (Smith II),213 are void of any analy-
sis of the framers' understanding of the "free exercise of reli-
gion" at the time of the drafting and ratification of the First
Amendment. Furthermore, the Smith II Court abandoned
nearly thirty years of free exercise jurisprudence as first estab-
lished in Sherbert v. Verner.21
The Free Exercise Clause commands that "Congress shall
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise of religion."2 15 The
plain meaning of these words intimates the preferred position
religious action and belief should have over secular concerns. 16
James Madison, a First Amendment framer in the forefront of
religious liberty, intended an unfettered right to free exercise.
According to Madison, only when "the preservation of equal lib-
erty, and the existence of the State be manifestly endangered12 17
could government impose secular limitations on the free exercise
of religion.21 a
210. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1413. In contrast, Court interpretations of the Es-
tablishment Clause contain lengthy analyses of its original meaning and historical con-
text. Id. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In his Everson dissent,
Justice Rutledge stated that "[n]o provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or
given content by its general history than the religious clause of the First Amendment."
Id. at 33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Professor McConnell's law review article, supra note 8, is perhaps the first scholarly
work to be primarily devoted to the historical perspective of the "free exercise of reli-
gion." He concluded that historical evidence supports the Sherbert interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1415.
211. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
212. See supra note 11.
213. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
214. For a detailed discussion of the Sherbert approach to free exercise of religion,
see supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
215. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
216. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
217. JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 52 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985).
218. See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
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Madison's sentiment was ignored when a member of the
Mormon Church raised a free exercise challenge to the federal
polygamy law in Reynolds v. United States.2'1 9 This was the first
time the Supreme Court was faced with a free exercise challenge
to federal legislation.22 0 The Court, perhaps overly concerned
with upholding the federal polygamy prohibition, held that relig-
iously motivated conduct could be prohibited in furtherance of
legitimate secular goals."' Working without precedent, the
Court decided that the law was too important to compromise.
Sherbert provided a novel approach to free exercise chal-
lenges to generally applicable laws that either interfere with re-
ligiously motivated conduct or compel conduct forbidden by reli-
gious belief.' Here, the Court was faced with a free exercise
challenge to a less compelling piece of federal legislation: the un-
employment compensation law. Recognizing, as Madison did,
that religious liberty is to take a preferred position in our soci-
ety, the Court struck a balance. Only when religious action
threatens some compelling state interest - a threat to public
safety, peace, or order - should the right to free exercise be
burdened by government, as long as the regulation is the least
restrictive means to further that interest.22
Smith II, on the other hand, sets forth a categorical rule.
Regardless of the state interest involved, if religious activity of
any type conflicts with a generally applicable law, the law con-
trols and the individual's religiously motivated conduct is not to
be tolerated. 24 The Court limited the use of the compelling in-
terest test to so-called "hybrid" cases, which involve not the
Free Exercise Clause alone, but free exercise in conjunction with
other constitutional protections.2 5 Smith II, contrary to both
219. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). For a detailed discussion of the Reynolds decision, see
supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
220. See ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 31.
221. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
222. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
223. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-08 (1963).
224. Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 882.
225. Id.; see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (involving free exercise
combined with parental rights); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (involving
free exercise combined with freedom of speech and press).
In Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, reh'g ordered, 946 F.2d
1573 (5th Cir. 1991), the first "hybrid" case to reach the United States Court of Appeals
19921
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the Madisonian interpretation of the "free exercise of religion"
and the principle of stare decisis, gives secular goals, regardless
of their gravity, the preferred position.
The Supreme Court has left the exercise of religion unpro-
tected. Religious believers and institutions are now limited in
their ability to effectively challenge facially neutral legislation
regardless of the effect it may have on their religious observance.
Moreover, legislative bodies are now free to vitiate religiously
motivated conduct under the guise of a generally applicable
law. 2 6 The gravity of the Smith I erosion will become self-evi-
dent, not in the isolated case that reaches appellate review, but
at the administrative and local level where laws will be passed
and decisions rendered.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Smith II demonstrates
that the majority could have reached the same result without
abandoning the Sherbert -test. She called for adherence to the
Sherbert test, but found that Oregon's compelling interest in en-
forcing its drug laws outweighed Smith's right to use peyote in a
since Smith II, the court protected an atheist's free exercise rights. The atheist claimant,
a prospective juror, was jailed for refusing to swear to tell the truth because it included a
reference to God. Id. at 1209. She subsequently filed suit against the judge claiming her
First Amendment rights had been violated. Id. at 1210-11. The court held that since the
claimant's refusal to take an oath involved both religion and speech, her conduct was
protected by the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 1216.
226. The classic example of a legislative attempt to vitiate the rights of a minority
under the guise of a generally applicable law is Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Here, the City of San Francisco passed a facially neutral ordinance which made it unlaw-
ful to carry on laundries in buildings not made of brick or stone. Id. at 358. The effect of
the ordinance was to drive small laundries owned by Chinese proprietors out of business,
because they were located in wooden buildings. Id. at 362. The court held that the ordi-
nance was unconstitutional because its application unlawfully discriminated against the
Chinese proprietors. Id. at 374.
A case now pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York demonstrates how dangerous Smith II could be at the local level. Leblanc-
Sternberg v. Fletcher, 781 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), presents an alleged attempt by
the newly incorporated Village of Airmont, New York, to prevent Orthodox Jews from
worshiping in a residential synagogue. Airmont is located within the Town of Ramapo in
Rockland County, New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the purpose behind incorporat-
ing the Village was to exclude Orthodox Jewish families. The plaintiffs' claimed that
Airmont, therefore, burdened their free exercise of religion and freedom of association.
Id. at 263-64. District Court Judge Goettel declined to dismiss the plaintiffs' First
Amendment claims. Id. at 273. In an earlier related case, five Orthodox Jewish families
unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the incorporation of Airmont. Leblanc-Sternberg v.
Fletcher, 763 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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religious ceremony.22 7 Although reasonable minds may differ
with Justice O'Connor's application of the Sherbert test, one
thing is certain: the test has worked in divergent factual situa-
tions and its retention is essential to ensure that the free exer-
cise of religion retains its preferred position in American
Society.
B. The Application of the Compelling Interest Test
The Sherbert test worked in several different contexts.
228
For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 229 when faced with a reli-
gious challenge by Amish parents to Wisconsin's compulsory
school attendance law, the Court ruled that the parental interest
in the religious upbringing of children outweighed the state's in-
terest in educating its citizens.230 In United States v. Lee,23'
when faced with a religious challenge by an Amish employer to
the federal social security tax laws, the Supreme Court held that
"[b]ecause the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax
system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with
the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax. ' 2 2 In
Bob Jones University v. United States,233 the Court faced a reli-
gious challenge to the denial of tax exempt status for a nonprofit
school; denial was based on the school's racially discriminatory
admissions policy.2 34 The majority found that the government's
interest in eradicating racial discrimination substantially out-
weighed any purported burden the denial of tax benefits placed
on the school's free exercise.236
227. Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 907 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
228. See supra notes 11, 107.
229. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
230. 406 U.S. at 235-36.
231. 455 U.S. 252 (1982); see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
232. 455 U.S. at 260. The governmental interest in collecting taxes has traditionally
been found compelling when weighed against religious challenges. See, e.g., Hernandez v.
C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (rejecting free exercise challenge to payment of income taxes
alleged to make religious activities more difficult).
Similarly, as Justice O'Connor found, the Smith II majority could have found the
state interest in illegal drug enforcement compelling when weighed against Smith's free
exercise challenge. See Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 907 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
233. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
234. Id. at 581-82.
235. Id. at 603-04.
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C. The Consequences of Smith II
The consequences of the Supreme Court's Smith II decision
are grave. Currently accepted religious exemptions, heretofore
protected by the court, could now be challenged. For example:
(1) a requirement that all witnesses testify as to the facts of
their knowledge without exception could destroy the confidenti-
ality of religious confessional;3 a (2) a prohibition on alcohol con-
sumption by minors could make the Christian sacrament of
communion illegal;281 (3) a uniform regulation of meat prepara-
tion could put kosher slaughterhouses out of business;23 a and (4)
a prohibition against discriminatory hiring practices could end
male celibate priesthood.2 3 9
In the following cases where religious exemptions were court
mandated, the same issues under Smith II would be decided
quite differently. In Church of God v. Amarillo Independent
School District,24 student members of the Worldwide Church of
God contested the right of the school system to penalize ab-
sences during their "Holy Week." A school regulation provided
that zeros be entered for exams missed for each student absent
from school more then twice annually for religious reasons.2 4" '
The court, employing the compelling interest test, enjoined en-
forcement of the school's regulation as applied to these Church
of God students. 22 If this case had arisen under Smith II, these
students would have had to forego their Holy Week or receive
zeros on missed exams.
In a later case, Islamic Center v. Starkville,4 the construc-
tion of a Moslem mosque was prohibited by municipal zoning
law. The court in this case, also invoking the compelling interest
236. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1411-12. McConnell discusses an analogous early
19th century case, People v. Philips, in which a New York court ruled that the need to
compel testimony regarding the return of stolen goods did not outweigh the resulting
interference between priests and penitents in the Roman Catholic Church. Id.
237. Id. at 1419.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. 511 F. Supp. 613, 615 (N.D. Tex. 1981), aff'd, 670 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1982); see
supra note 107 and accompanying text.
241. 511 F. Supp. at 615.
242. Id. at 618.
243. 840 F.2d 293, 294 (5th Cir. 1988); see supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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test, ordered the city to grant the congregation a variance."
Under Smith II, no variance need be issued to generally applica-
ble zoning laws. Finally, in Moody v. Cronin,2" a Pentecostal
high school student refused to wear gym clothes her religion
considered immodest. The court, invoking the compelling inter-
est test, held that refusal to provide a religious exemption vio-
lated her constitutional right to free exercise of religion.2"
Under Smith II, this female student would have to choose be-
tween obeying the school regulation or obeying her religious con-
victions and incurring possible expulsion.
D. The Erosion Has Begun
The erosive effect of Smith II has already been demon-
strated in State v. Hershberger.217 Minnesota law required slow
moving vehicles to display an orange-red florescent triangular
emblem when operating on state public highways.248 The appel-
lants, members of the Old Order Amish religion, strictly adhere
to the principle tenet of their religion to remain separate and
apart from the modern world.24 9 Accordingly, they refused to
display the emblem on their horse and buggies, which resulted
in appellants receiving traffic citations.5 °
The Minnesota Supreme Court, using the Sherbert compel-
ling interest test, determined that although the appellants had a
sincere religious belief that had been infringed upon and that
Minnesota had a compelling state interest in the safety of its
public highways, there was a less restrictive alternative availa-
ble - using lighted red lanterns.2 1 Thus, the appellants free
exercise claim was upheld.2 5 On appeal, the Supreme Court va-
cated judgment and "remanded to the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota for further consideration in light of [Smith 1]. '253
244. 840 F.2d at 302-03.
245. 484 F. Supp. 270, 272 (C.D. Ill. 1979).
246. Id. at 277.
247. 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989), vacated, 495 U.S. 901 (1990).
248. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d at 284.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 289.
252. Id.
253. Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901 (1990).
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On remand, in what appears to be an attempt to circumvent
Smith H, the Minnesota Supreme Court unanimously dismissed
the charges on state constitutional grounds.2 5 The court rea-
soned that because the language of the Minnesota Bill of Rights
is "of distinctively stronger character than the federal counter-
part . ..Minnesotans are afforded greater protection for reli-
gious liberties against governmental action under the state con-
stitution than under the first amendment of the federal
constitution. '" ' 5 5 The court's approach suggests that state courts,
uncomfortable with the Smith H approach to free exercise, will
seek other grounds for granting religious exemptions to state
legislation.
Smith H is currently being applied by lower courts to re-
strict religious exercise. An intolerable display of the Smith H
erosion is presented in Yang v. Sturner.5 s The Yangs, devoted
members of the Hmong community, adhere to a religious tenet
that prohibits mutilation of the body through an autopsy. 5 The
Yangs' son died following an unsuccessful attempt by the hospi-
tal to rescue him after a seizure.2 58 The state medical examiner
performed an autopsy on the body because the hospital could
not determine the cause of the seizure.2 59 The autopsy was per-
formed without the knowledge or consent of the Yangs.2" °
In the liability portion of the opinion, decided before Smith
II, the court, relying in part on Sherbert and its progeny,
254. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1990). In Society of Jesus of
New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990), another case
decided on state constitutional grounds, the historical landmark designation of a church
interior was held to unconstitutionally burden religious worship. Society of Jesus sug-
gests that majority religions are not immune to the wrath of Smith H.
255. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 397. In discussing the language of the Minnesota
Constitution, the court noted that:
Whereas the first amendment establishes a limit on government action at the
point of prohibiting the exercise of religion, section 16 precludes even an infringe-
ment on or interference with religious freedom. Accordingly, government actions
that may not constitute an outright prohibition on religious practices (thus not
violating the first amendment) could nonetheless infringe on or interfere with
those practices, violating the Minnesota Constitution.
Id.
256. 728 F. Supp. 845, withdrawn, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
257. 750 F. Supp. at 558.
258. 728 F. Supp. at 846.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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granted summary judgement to the Yangs.261 Before the dam-
ages portion of the case was decided, the Smith II decision was
rendered.26 Judge Pettine expressed "profound regret" that he
was subsequently "constrained" by Smith II, but nevertheless
withdrew his prior decision on liability and dismissed the case
with prejudice.263
In Intercommunity Center for Justice and Peace v. Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service,264 six Roman Catholic nuns
claimed that their religious beliefs prevented them from comply-
ing with the employer verification provisions of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act. 266 The nuns offered employment to
people in need without regard to their immigration status.216
The nuns claimed that the teachings of the Roman Catholic
Church imposed a religious duty on them to sustain the lives of
all people regardless of their immigration status.267 Relying on
Smith II, the court held that there was "no constitutional right
implicated here .... 28
Such cases reveal the states' power, as derived from the
Smith II decision, to burden free exercise. With states free to
control religious conduct through legislation that is facially neu-
tral, Smith H's erosive effect on religious liberty is manifest.
Perhaps Judge Shapiro of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania summed it up best when
faced with a member of the Religious Society of Friends
(Quakers) who refused to pay the military portion of his income
taxes:
It is ironic that here in Pennsylvania, the woods to which
[William] Penn led the Religious Society of Friends to enjoy the
261. Id. at 855-57.
262. 750 F. Supp. at 558.
263. Id. at 560. For another free exercise case upholding state compelled autopsy
under Smith II, see Montgomery v. County of Clinton, 743 F. Supp. 1253 (W.D. Mich.
1990) (holding that the incidental effect of state mandated autopsy on claimants' religion
does not offend the First Amendment), aff'd, 940 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1991).
264. 910 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1990).
265. Id. at 43. The Immigration Reform and Control Act requires that employers
verify that each of their employees is authorized to work in the United States. 8 U.S.C. §
1324a (1988).
266. 910 F.2d at 43.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 46.
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blessings of religious liberty, neither the Constitution nor its Bill
of Rights protects the policy of that Society not to coerce or vio-
late the consciences of its employees and members with respect to
their religious principles, or to act as an agent for our government
in doing so. More than three hundred years after their founding
of Philadelphia, and almost two hundred years after the adoption
of the First Amendment, it would be a "constitutional anomaly"
to the Supreme Court, [Smith II], if the Religious Society of
Friends were allowed to respect decisions of its employee-mem-
bers bearing witness to their faith.2 "
E. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Erosion of
Smith II
As this Note goes to press, the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1991 (RFRA) is now before the House Subcommittee
on Civil and Constitutional Rights.270 RFRA has the narrow pur-
pose of circumventing Smith II by restoring the Sherbert com-
pelling interest test.2 71 In introducing the Bill, Congressman Ste-
269. United States v. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y of Friends,
753 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
270. H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
271. 137 CONG. REC. E2422 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Rep. Solarz).
RFRA was introduced on June 26, 1991, and was referred to the Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights on July 26, 1991. As of April 5, 1992, the number of Congres-
sional co-sponsors to the Bill had grown to 174.
Under section 2 of the proposed Bill, the following congressional findings were made:
(1) "the framers of the American Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an
unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution";
(2) "laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws in-
tended to interfere with religious exercise"; (3) "governments should not burden religious
exercise without compelling justification"; (4) "in Employment Division of Oregon v.
Smith the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government jus-
tify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion"; and (5) "the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing gov-
ernmental interests." H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
The enumerated purposes of the bill are: (1) "to restore the compelling interest test
as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its applica-
tion in all cases where free exercise of religion is burdened"; and (2) "to provide a claim
or defense to persons whose religious exercise is burdened by government." Id.
Section 3 of the Bill provides in pertinent part:
SEC. 3. THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION PROTECTED.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Government shall not burden a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss2/7
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phen J. Solarz of New York stated that "America cannot afford
to lose its first freedom - the freedom not just to believe but
to act according to the dictates of one's religious faith - free
from the restrictions of governmental regulation or interfer-
ence. '"272 Broad support for RFRA has come from Congress as
well as from the religious and civil rights communities. 27" Among
RFRA's supporters is the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Reli-
gion, a group of organizations with widely divergent views.274
The breadth of RFRA's support demonstrates the degree to
which the Smith II decision is perceived as erosive to religious
liberty.
While RFRA would not dictate results in particular cases, it
would require the government to justify restrictions on relig-
iously motivated conduct. Without this Legislation, however, re-
ligious liberty is protected "only [in] the extreme and hypotheti-
cal situation in which a State directly targets a religious
in subsection (b).
(b) ExcEPTION.-Government may burden a person's exercise of religion only
if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
(1) is essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmen-
tal interest.
Id.
272. 137 CONG. REC. E2422 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Rep. Solarz).
273. Id. There has arisen, however, opposition to RFRA. These opponents, which
include several conservative members of Congress, belong primarily to the "right to life"
camp. Apparently, some staunch anti-abortion advocates have begun to fear that RFRA
would provide a way for women to obtain an abortion even if Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), were to be overturned by the Supreme Court. Robert P. Hey, Religious Freedom
Legislation Could Snag on Abortion Controversy, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, July 1, 1991,
at 8. This fear primarily stems from the religious tenet, existing in Judaism and other
faiths, that abortion is required in any pregnancy where the life of the mother is in
danger. See, e.g., MISHNA, Ahalos 7:1 (requiring that the fetus be sacrificed if necessary
to save the mothers life); RAMBAM, YAD HA'KHAZAKA, Laws Concerning a Murder and the
Preservation of Life 1:9 (permitting a fetus posing a life-threatening danger to be viewed
as "in pursuit" of the mother's life and consequently subject to termination in defense of
the mother). In spite of the narrow circumstances under which religiously mandated
abortion might be sought, even the slightest hint of a legally prescribed abortion seems
sufficient to provoke intense opposition.
274. This coalition includes the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Jew-
ish Congress, the American Muslim Council, the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Af-
fairs, the Christian Legal Society, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the
Episcopal Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the National Council of
Churches, the People for the American Way and the National Association of
Evangelicals.
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practice." '75 Such a narrow interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause is antagonistic to the very nature of our Nation's histori-
cal commitment to religious freedom.276
V. Conclusion
For almost thirty years, strict scrutiny was the standard
courts were to apply when faced with a free exercise challenge to
legislation that burdened religious practice. 277 That time-tested
precedent was abandoned when Justice Scalia stated that "[w]e
have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse his
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate. 2 78 By effectively prohibiting reli-
gious challenges to generally applicable laws, the Supreme Court
has condoned the repression of religious freedom.279
The immediate consequence of Smith II was to deny unem-
ployment compensation to two Native Americans because they
participated in a precisely circumscribed religious ritual, integral
to the worship practices the Native American Church. In effect,
the state of Oregon was allowed to deny members of the Native
American Church the right to communion as historically prac-
ticed in their church. Oregon, however, was not required to pro-
vide even the slightest evidence that such denial was justified.
Rather, it was sufficient that the law ultimately prohibiting such
275. Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra notes 185-91
and accompanying text.
276. According to Congressman Solarz:
Religious freedom is the foundation of our way of life. This Nation has always
provided a haven for refugees from religious persecution. We are Americans be-
cause those who came before us voted for freedom with their feet. My family, like
many of yours, came to America to worship freely. Even today, Jews from the
Soviet Union, Buddhists from Southeast Asia, Catholics from Northern Ireland,
Bahais from Iran, and many more willingly renounce their homelands and risk
their lives for the luxury of religious freedom.
The Court's grievous and shortsighted error must not be permitted to stand
unchallenged. That is why 41 of my colleagues and I have introduced the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act. This legislation will simply restore the legal stan-
dard for protecting religious freedom that worked so well for more than a
generation.
137 CONG. REc. E2422 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Rep. Solarz).
277. See supra notes 93-119 and accompanying text.
278. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79
(1990) (Smith II).
279. See id. at 890.
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religious worship was facially neutral.
Laws infringing upon religious exercise should be subject to
the highest degree of scrutiny, particularly a law that has the
effect of banning certain integral aspects of religious practice.
Historically, our Nation has fought to preserve religious free-
dom. The Smith II majority has seriously abridged the funda-
mental right to free exercise of religion without providing an ad-
equate explanation. One can only speculate, as Justice
Blackmun did in his dissent, as to the "evils" the majority was
seeking to avoid.180 One can, however, identify the "evils" em-
braced by this decision.28 In supporting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, '  we can restore the "luxury"283 - the
unalienable right of free exercise of religion - the Founding
Fathers held so dear.
Paul S. Zilberfein*
280. See id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
281. See supra notes 236-46 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 270-76 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
* The author would like to dedicate this note to the memory of his father, Charles
Zilberfein, who was forced to endure religious persecution in Nazi-occupied Poland.
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